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Abstract
In this work, we evaluate adversarial robustness
in the context of transfer learning from a source
trained on CIFAR 100 to a target network trained
on CIFAR 10. Specifically, we study the effects
of using robust optimisation in the source and
target networks. This allows us to identify trans-
fer learning strategies under which adversarial
defences are successfully retained, in addition to
revealing potential vulnerabilities. We study the
extent to which features learnt by a fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGSM) and its iterative alterna-
tive (PGD) can preserve their defence properties
against black and white-box attacks under three
different transfer learning strategies. We find that
using PGD examples during training on the source
task leads to more general robust features that are
easier to transfer. Furthermore, under successful
transfer, it achieves 5.2% more accuracy against
white-box PGD attacks than suitable baselines.
Overall, our empirical evaluations give insights
on how well adversarial robustness under transfer
learning can generalise.
1. Introduction
Machine learning models, in general, are known to be vul-
nerable to adversarial examples. For instance, certain imper-
ceptible perturbations to the input can result in an incorrect
classification (Szegedy et al., 2013; Jia & Liang, 2017). This
should be concerning when such methods need to be de-
ployed in safety-critical applications, such as autonomous
vehicles or surgical robots (Warde-Farley & Goodfellow,
2016; Yuan et al., 2019). A notable formulation of robust-
ness against adversarial attacks is that of Madry et al. who
formulate it as a "robust optimisation"-based problem:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼Dmax

J(θ, x + , y) s.t  ∈ S
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Here, J(θ, x, y) is a loss specified in advance, where the tu-
ple (x, y) of the input and its label is sampled from some
distribution D. In this formulation, the adversary’s task is to
maximise the inner optimisation problem while the defender
minimises the outer one. The adversary is specified through
some threat model and is realised as a set of allowed pertur-
bations S. A defence can then be learned by augmenting
the training data with adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2014).
Transfer learning (TL) is commonly used deep learning
technique. It has been showed to improve the performance
as well as speed up training on variety of tasks (Pan &
Yang, 2010b). To this end, little has been done towards
assessing adversarial robustness under the scope of TL. We
hypothesise that evaluating the efficacy of robust features
under transfer can help us identify strategies under which
adversarial defences are successfully retained. This can
allow us to identify more informative ways to both defend
and attack neural networks.
Our empirical evaluation indicates that adversarial robust-
ness against black-box (BB) attacks transfers more consis-
tently. In white-box (WB) scenarios, defence mechanisms
benefit from using robust optimisation in both source and
target. Further, adversarial training using PGD leads to
learning more general robust features that can maintain their
properties under transfer better than the alternative. With
this, our empirical findings are the following:
• Robustness: We compared the level of transferred ro-
bustness between two tasks. PGD-based defences were
easier to transfer than FGSM-based ones. Defending
against simpler attacks sufficed from defending lower-
level features only which are easier to transfer.
• Generalisation: We evaluate the ability to generalise
against two threat models. We achieve 5.2% higher
accuracy against WB PGD adversaries using robust
weight initialisation as well as adversarial examples
during training the target.
• Performance: We study the performance of different
combinations of robust and clean optimisation routines.
We visualise the results using normalised heatmaps and
a complete table with accuracies.
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Figure 1. This figure represents a general outline of the acquired
pipeline for evaluation. The subscripts follow the nomenclature
for describing the network’s way of training. Nat stands for clean
training which means no adversarial examples were used whereas
adv stands for adversarial training. For the networks obtained
through transfer learning, we first mention the method of training
its source (nat or adv) and then the method of transfer learning (nat
or adv). In this context, the CIFAR100 networks (pink) are only
an intermediary step on which we perform transfer learning.
2. Methodology
2.1. Transfer learning
Transfer learning in CNNs can be achieved through retrain-
ing using various strategies (Yosinski et al., 2014). One can
use the network as a feature extractor by freezing all the
layers and only retraining the last one (Sharif Razavian et al.,
2014) or fine-tuning a larger part of the network (Oquab
et al., 2014). However, adversarial robustness may not nec-
essarily be transferable in this process. So, we evaluate this
property using the following three learning strategies: a)
freeze all layers and retrain only the final layer, b) unfreeze
only the last block of our network and, c) retrain the whole
network, essentially using the source as an initialisation
strategy.
2.2. Setup details
In our experiments we used a Resnet56 network, denoted as
R, which is an architecture specifically designed for the CI-
FAR dataset (He et al., 2015). Transfer learning is from CI-
FAR100 to CIFAR10, where the images from both datasets
where re-scaled to pixel values in [-1,1].
2.3. Threat models
As threat models, we use as adversaries the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and the Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) algorithm (Kurakin et al.,
2016) which is an iterative variant of FGSM.
FGSM creates an adversarial example x′ by following the
gradient of the loss function with respect to the true label
ytrue. It then takes a single step  towards that direction:
x′ = x +  · sign∇xJ(θ, x, y)
PGD turns FGSM into an iterative attack, ensuring at each
step that the adversarial example x′ is within the l∞ ball
around x with radius :
xk = Clipx,(xk−1 + α · sign∇xJ(θ, x, y))
where k denotes the number of iterations and α the step
taken at each iteration.
An intriguing property of FGSM is label leaking, where the
network achieves greater accuracy in the adversarial exam-
ples than with the clean ones (Kurakin et al., 2016). This
happens most likely because FGSM produces a predictable
perturbation which the network is able to identify. To avoid
this effect, one can replace the true label ytrue with the most
likely label predicted by the model.
Establishing the defence objective
When performing adversarial training we modify the loss to
be the average of the adversarial and clean loss, with equal
weights Ltot = (Ladv + Lclean)/2. We weighted the two losses
equally because we were aiming for both robustness and
accuracy. Cross-entropy is used for the individual losses.
Each batch had 200 examples, 100 clean images and 100
adversarial examples generated based on the most recent
parameters of the network using the current clean examples.
We used a standard  = 0.0625 which corresponds to pixel
intensity of 8256 . For the PGD adversary, we used 7 iterations
and a learning rate α = 4 as was done by Madry et al. 2018.
We trained and used a DenseNet 121 to construct the BB
attacks.
3. Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the effect of using transfer learning in the pro-
cess of building defence mechanisms against adversarial
attacks. We perform a series of empirical evaluations and
report our results in this section.
Figure 1 introduces the general outline of the pipeline for
evaluation. For brevity, we define Rsrc→tar, where src, tar ∈
{nat, adv}, as a network (R) learned with transfer learning.
For example, Rnat→adv was trained with clean examples (nat)
on the source domain and used both clean and adversarial
examples (adv) during transfer. Radv→adv was trained with
both clean and adversarial examples from the same threat
model in both source and target tasks. We evaluate the
networks using the clean accuracy, as well as the accuracy
An Empirical Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness under Transfer Learning
against 4 adversaries, namely BB and WB attacks using
FGSM and PGD.
3.1. Empirical Analysis of Transferring Robust
Features
Figure 2. Heatmap comparison between the per column normalised
results where 1 indicates the highest result and 0 the lowest. The
table contains an empirical evaluation of the transferability of each
defence routine for all considered strategies. Horizontal red lines
separate transfer strategies where each model is named using the
source/target type of training and the number describes the amount
of unfrozen layers. No number indicates the model was trained
without transfer and 56 indicates complete training using source’s
weights for initialisation. ’no_ll’ indicates no label leaking consid-
ered. Vertical red lines separate clean accuracy from the robustness
achieved against WB and BB attacks. Percentage values on top
represent the per column min/max accuracy. Overall using PGD in
source results in higher ratios of transferred robustness compared
to using FGSM. Keeping only lower-level features frozen leads to
highest amounts of preserved robustness against BB attacks.
Threat models have been shown to successfully attack both
known and unknown architectures. Current defence sys-
tems have been targeting the actual attacks to a specific task
and architecture. In practice, however, we would like to
learn specific representations that can generalise to different
settings. In this section, we evaluate the ability of defence
systems to generalise to different tasks in the context of
transfer learning. We examine the amount of transferable
robustness from a source task to some target by training 3 in-
dependent neural networks on CIFAR100, namely: one that
does not use adversarial examples during training and hence
has no defence mechanism, one that uses examples gener-
ated using FGSM and a final network that uses examples
generated using PGD. We report our results in Figure 2.
The figure depicts the amount of transferred robustness
across all strategies as a min-max normalised per attack
heatmap. The first three rows show the robustness for the
baseline networks that were trained with no transfer. Using
PGD or FGSM samples during training performed equally
well against BB attacks. In the former case, however, the
resulted network is more robust against PGD-based WB
attacks and less robust against FGSM-based ones. When
training using FGSM generated samples we achieve the op-
posite results. These observations align with the ones made
in (Madry et al., 2018) but we found FGSM to be more
robust against PGD most likely because we consider label
leaking.
The next three blocks of rows (or 9 rows in total) report the
results from transferring robustness using the three differ-
ent strategies. Unlike the case in the absence of transfer,
defence mechanisms developed using PGD are more likely
to preserve the robustness of the learned features against
BB attacks when used on the different task. However, both
approaches seem to transfer proportionally the same amount
of the achieved robustness against WB attacks. WB attacks
are tailored for a specific architecture, hence directly trans-
ferring robustness was not expected to be as successful.
Overall, iterative learning results in more intricate and gen-
eral features. However, the two tasks are distinct enough
to not allow for the direct use of the learned features (see
second block of results in Figure 2). Regardless, unfreezing
the final block of ResNet56 resulted in an almost complete
transfer of the defence against BB attacks. This itself sug-
gests that robust low level features are sufficient to defend
just as well against such simpler attacks. Such features are
easier to transfer too. Recent work, (Andrew Ilyas, 2019),
made similar observations and proposed a theoretical frame-
work for studying such features. Unlike us, the authors do
not focus on the transferability between tasks.
Evaluating against WB attacks, however, seems to be more
successful at targeting aspects of the representation related
to the higher levels of abstraction such as representations
of the objects and sub-objects that are present in the input.
Such attacks, however, have been shown to sometimes get
stuck at local minimas resulting in weaker attacks (Carlini
& Wagner, 2016). Using robust features as initialisation
does not seem to have as good of an effect when training
the target network with clean examples only. That said, they
can potentially allow for iterative methods to overcome the
above limitations by ensuring better starting point for the
optimisation procedure.
Finally, none of the reported methods fully matched or ex-
ceeded the performance of the baselines. In the next section
we attempt to combine our findings with adversarial training
applied on the target task as well.
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Figure 3. Heatmap comparison between the per column normalised
results across different training routines. The table compares the
use of adversarial examples in different combinations between
source and target. Horizontal red lines separate different training
routines. The numerical values within the heatmap are the per
column normalised results. ’no_ll’ indicates no label leaking taken
into account. Vertical red lines separate clean accuracy from the
robustness achieved against WB and BB attacks. Percentage values
on top represent the per column min/max accuracy. Overall, good
weight initialisation leads to improved performance of PGD-based
defence mechanisms where robust initialisation is most effective.
3.2. Improving Defence Mechanisms with Transfer
Successfully applying transfer learning has been shown to
improve the performance as well as speed up training on a
variety of tasks (Pan & Yang, 2010a; Yosinski et al., 2014).
This suggests it can potentially enable building stronger,
more general defence mechanisms as well as more complex
attacks. We study the extent to which transfer learning can
help us improve established defence mechanisms against
adversarial attacks and the effects this has to clean accuracy.
To this end, we compare the performance of an exhaustive
list of models using adversarial attacks that follows the out-
line in Figure 1. Figure 3 reports the performance of the best
models per each of the 3 transfer learning strategies. Those
omitted did not transfer robustness and are thus removed
for brevity. The complete tables of results in % and as a
heatmap is provided in the Appendix. We use as baselines
the non-transferred networks as well as networks that used
transfer, but did not have any learned defence mechanisms.
Using robust features as initialisation did not lead to positive
results in the previous section. However, when combined
with robust optimisation applied on the target network, it
improved performance in the context of WB attacks while
maintaining similar robustness as the baselines’ against BB
attacks. In fact, robust initialisation for Rpgd→pgd achieves
5.2% accuracy improvement against WB PGD attacks, in-
line with recent observations about the properties of pre-
training (Hendrycks et al., 2019). Training Rnat→pgd by
unfreezing the last block of layers only did not result in
successful transfer, even though we used adversarially per-
turbed examples during training. This is somewhat expected
as we already saw that the lower level features are easier to
attack and thus all attacks managed to exploit this. Finally,
Radv→adv seems to have a negative effect when using non-
iterative methods. This itself again correlates with (Athalye
et al., 2018) and can be interpreted as ensuring that iterative
attacks during training do not get stuck in local minima
which itself ensures building a stronger defence. Hypotheti-
cally, using a similar approach can lead to building stronger
attacks too. Unfreezing the final block of ResNet gets close
to the baseline results however requires less resources. Nev-
ertheless, both networks obtain a lot worse clean accuracy.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we investigate the use of transfer learning in
the context of defending against adversarial perturbations.
We showed that using FGSM and PGD during training re-
sults in different behaviour under transfer. PGD learns more
general features that are easier to transfer to a different task.
We found that lower level features by themselves play sig-
nificant role in robustness against both WB and BB attacks
and seem to be more transferable among tasks. Moreover,
we showed that initialising with robust features can help
improve the overall achieved robustness. When using PGD
samples during re-training our analysis led to a 5.2% ro-
bustness improvement against a WB PGD adversary for
Radv→adv compared to Radv and an overall stronger defence.
A combination of freezing low-level features and training
the final block of ResNet56 provides a good trade off that is
both close to the best achieved results while requiring a lot
less training time.
The reported results suggest that the current success against
BB attacks can be achieved just by focusing on the lower
level features of the network. On the other hand, WB attacks
are able to target more complicated, higher level, "categor-
ical" features, which makes it more challenging to defeat.
Building attacks that can better exploit this observation
could result in more challenging adversaries.
In the future, we aim to further investigate the performance
of defence mechanisms on a broader range of attacks and
under transfer on different architectures. Further, we want to
better understand the theoretical implications of the reported
findings. Finally, we plan to extend the evaluation on control
tasks in a simulated or a real-world setting.
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Table 1: The results on black-box (BB) and white-box (WB) attacks. All networks were attacked with adversarial examples
generated on the naturally trained DenseNet on CIFAR10. We achieve 5.2% higher accuracy against WB PGD adversaries
using robust weight initialisation as well as adversarial examples throughout the training of the target.
Network Natural BB-FGSM BB-PGD WB-FGSM WB-PGD
Rnat 92.5% 34.7% 12.6% 20.0% 0.0%
Rnat→nat 1 73.1% 33.5% 30.2% 7.4% 0.0%
Rnat→nat 18 91.2% 41.1% 24.6% 18.4% 0.0%
Rnat→nat 56 92.6% 35.0% 14.9% 18.5% 0.0%
R f gsm 87.1% 81.5% 82.2% 78.6% 13.5%
R f gsm_no_ll 87.4% 76.0% 78.1% 88.5% 0.2%
R f gsm→nat 1 69.0% 46.3% 54.0% 23.5% 0.0%
R f gsm→nat 18 89.1% 58.3% 65.1% 43.3% 2.4%
R f gsm→nat 56 91.9% 37.9% 27.9% 23.6% 0.0%
Rnat→ f gsm 1 69.3% 40.9% 38.8% 13.1% 0.0%
Rnat→ f gsm 18 77.3% 65.0% 60.2% 41.9% 0.5%
Rnat→ f gsm 56 88.1% 69.3% 71.3% 78.4% 1.8%
R f gsm→ f gsm 1 66.6% 56.2% 60.0% 42.7% 0.2%
R f gsm→ f gsm 18 87.2% 71.4% 76.6% 67.5% 2.9%
R f gsm→ f gsm 56 85.7% 65.2% 66.3% 72.3% 1.5%
Rpgd 83.9% 81.1% 82.1% 45.4% 36.1%
Rpgd→nat 1 64.9% 62.6% 63.0% 18.0% 12.0%
Rpgd→nat 18 84.6% 80.4% 81.6% 26.2% 12.5%
Rpgd→nat 56 91.4% 42.4% 31.9% 19.9% 0.0%
Rnat→pgd 1 52.2% 30.6% 32.8% 13.2% 0.0%
Rnat→pgd 18 60.8% 31.6% 30.7% 20.0% 1.0%
Rnat→pgd 56 81.5% 79.2% 79.9% 45.6% 39.2%
Rpgd→pgd 1 61.3% 59.6% 60.0% 25.6% 20.3%
Rpgd→pgd 18 81.3% 78.6% 79.6% 45.1% 39.1%
Rpgd→pgd 56 82.6% 80.1% 80.9% 47.7% 41.3%
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Figure 4. The complete heatmap comparison between the per column normalised results. 1 indicates the highest result and 0 the lowest.
The table contains an empirical evaluation of the transferability of each defence routine for all considered strategies. Horizontal red lines
separate transfer strategies where each model is named using the source/target type of training and the number describes the amount of
unfrozen layers. No number next to the model’s name indicates the model was trained without transfer and 56 indicates complete training
using source’s weights for initialisation. ’ f gsm_no_ll’ indicates an FGSM attack with no label leaking taken into account. Vertical red
lines separate clean accuracy from the robustness achieved against WB and BB attacks. Percentage values on top represent the per column
min/max accuracy. Overall using PGD in source results in higher ratios of transferred robustness compared to using FGSM. Transferring
only lower-level features leads to highest amounts of preserved robustness against BB attacks.
An Empirical Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness under Transfer Learning
Figure 5. Heatmap comparison between the per column normalised results in each table where 1 indicates the highest result and 0 the
lowest. The table contains an empirical comparison between the transferability of FGSM against PGD for all considered strategies.
Horizontal red lines separate the robust components across the different transfer strategies where each model is named using the
source/target type of training and the number describes the amount of unfrozen layers. No number indicates the model was trained without
transfer and 56 indicates complete training using source’s weights for initialisation. Vertical red lines separate clean accuracy from the
robustness achieved against WB and BB attacks. Percentage values on top represent the per column min/max accuracy. Overall using
PGD defences is easier to transfer. Notice how the highest achieved results in the table reporting the use of FGSM is without transfer
while this is not the case for the rightmost table reporting results obtained using PGD.
